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Influenza viruses mutate frequently, necessitating constant updates of 1 
vaccine viruses. To establish experimental approaches that may complement the 2 
current vaccine strain selection process, we selected antigenic variants from human 3 
H1N1 and H3N2 influenza virus libraries possessing random mutations in the 4 
globular head of the haemagglutinin protein (which includes the antigenic sites) by 5 
incubating them with human and/or ferret convalescent sera to human H1N1 and 6 
H3N2 viruses. Further, we selected antigenic escape variants from human viruses 7 
treated with convalescent sera and from mice that had been previously immunized 8 
against human influenza viruses. Our pilot studies with past influenza viruses 9 
identified escape mutants that were antigenically similar to variants that emerged in 10 
nature, establishing the feasibility of our approach. Our studies with contemporary 11 
human influenza viruses identified escape mutants before they caused an epidemic 12 
in 2014–2015. This approach may aid in the prediction of potential antigenic escape 13 
variants and the selection of future vaccine candidates before they become 14 
widespread in nature. 15 
 4 
The haemagglutinin (HA) protein is the major influenza viral antigen1 and the 1 
primary target of infection-neutralizing antibodies. During influenza virus circulation in 2 
humans, the antigenicity of the virus gradually changes due to mutations in the globular 3 
head of HA, necessitating frequent updates of the influenza vaccine2,3. Selection of 4 
antigenic variants of influenza viruses in humans is believed to be driven by neutralizing 5 
antibodies4. Currently, seasonal influenza vaccine strains are selected based on the 6 
antigenicity of clinical isolates and cross-reactive immunity in human populations in 7 
combination with genetic and epidemiologic data5. This decision has to be made more 8 
than six months prior to the onset of the influenza season to allow sufficient time for 9 
vaccine manufacture. At the time of decision making, novel antigenic clusters may not 10 
have emerged or may not yet be recognized, occasionally resulting in the selection of 11 
vaccine strains that differ antigenically from the viruses circulating during the subsequent 12 
influenza season, leading to low vaccine effectiveness6,7. Presently, no experimental or 13 
computational methods exist to predict future antigenic variants before they emerge in 14 
nature. We, therefore, developed an experimental strategy to predict the antigenic 15 
evolution of human influenza A viruses.  16 
In our approach (Fig. 1), mutant virus libraries with random mutations in the 17 
antigenic region of HA are screened in vitro with antisera against circulating viruses or in 18 
mice immunized against the circulating viruses. The antigenic properties of the escape 19 
mutants are analyzed by using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. Antigenic 20 
cartography (an established method to visualize and analyze HI data8) is then used to 21 
identify novel antigenic clusters that may necessitate the update of an influenza vaccine. 22 
 5 
 
This experimental approach could identify novel antigenic clusters before they emerge in 1 
nature and complement the current vaccine selection process.     2 
Antigenic evolution of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses 3 
First, we performed a proof-of-concept study to identify and characterize 4 
antigenic escape variants to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza A (A(H1N1)pdm09) 5 
viruses. Eight convalescent sera collected from A(H1N1)pdm09-infected individuals in 6 
Japan (Supplementary Table 1) were mixed with two A(H1N1)pdm09 clinical isolates 7 
and escape viruses were isolated using plaque assays in Madin-Darby canine kidney 8 
(MDCK) cells. Escape mutants possessed the K153E/N239K, D127E, or K163E 9 
mutations (H1 numbering; Supplementary Table 2). HI assays with ferret antisera against 10 
the escape variants confirmed that they were antigenically distinct from their parental 11 
viruses (Supplementary Table 3).  12 
To further explore the antigenic landscape, we generated a virus library with 13 
random mutations in the HA globular head (encompassing amino acids 54–253; 14 
Supplementary Fig. 1 and Supplementary Table 4). This region spans the four antigenic 15 
domains including antigenic site Sa (positions 124, 125, 153–157, and 159–164)9-12 to 16 
which two of the selected mutations (K153E and K163E) map. For library generation, we 17 
chose the A(H1N1)pdm09 A/Norway/3858/2009 HA whose globular head sequence 18 
closely matches the consensus sequence of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses. The HA mutant 19 
library was screened for escape mutants with the 14 human convalescent sera indicated in 20 
Supplementary Table 1. We sequenced the HA gene of more than 500 plaque-purified 21 
viruses and identified 92 HA mutant clones (Supplementary Table 5), including viruses 22 
 6 
with the mutations D127E and K163E detected in our preliminary experiments. 1 
Importantly, no mutations were found in the HA gene of wild-type virus after three 2 
consecutive passages in MDCK cells, indicating that the identified mutations were not 3 
selected during virus replication in these cells. HI assays confirmed that single amino 4 
acid changes at four positions in the Sa antigenic site (153, 154, 155, 156) caused 4–8-5 
fold reductions in HI titres; Supplementary Table 5). In addition, 2–4-fold reduction in HI 6 
titres were caused by mutations at other positions in antigenic site Sa (125, 127, 129 and 7 
163) as well as one position adjacent to site Sb (183). Collectively, these data 8 
demonstrate the importance of antigenic site Sa for A(H1N1)pdm09 antigenicity.  9 
Previously, Koel et al. demonstrated that amino acid mutations at seven positions 10 
(142, 152, 153, 155, 156, 186, and 190; H1 numbering) of seasonal H3N2 influenza 11 
viruses altered antigenicity13. Although the primary amino acid sequences of H1 and H3 12 
HAs differ by ~57%, their antigenic sites substantially overlap9,10,14. We, therefore, 13 
included these positions in our analysis of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses. On the basis of 14 
sequence comparisons of seasonal H1N1 vaccine virus strains from 1977 to 2007, we 15 
also selected position 141 (identified in our preliminary escape mutant selection) and 16 
position 187 (located close to key antigenic positions 186 and 190) for further analysis.  17 
Next, we generated A/Norway/3858/2009 HA libraries that represent all 20 amino 18 
acids at each of the 15 selected positions (i.e., HA positions 125, 127, 129, 141, 142, 152, 19 
153, 154, 155, 156, 163, 183, 186, 187, and 190) (Supplementary Fig. 1 and 20 
Supplementary Table 6). These HA mutant libraries were individually screened with 21 
ferret antisera as shown in Supplementary Table 7. Libraries for which we did not have 22 
escape mutant-specific antisera (HA positions 141, 142, 152, 186, 187, and 190) were 23 
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screened with antiserum to wild-type virus; libraries for which we isolated antigenic 1 
escape mutants in our earlier experiments (namely, HA positions 125, 127, 129, 153, 154, 2 
155, 156, 163, and 183) were screened with antisera to the N125D, D127E, N129D, 3 
K153E, K154N, G155E, N156D, K163E, or S183P escape mutants, respectively, to 4 
obtain additional mutants at the respective positions. For each screen, at least 11 plaque-5 
purified viruses were characterized for their HA sequence and antigenicity 6 
(Supplementary Table 8). Mutations at positions 153–156 reduced HI titres up to 16-fold, 7 
suggesting that these HA positions play a major role in A(H1N1)pdm09 HA antigenicity. 8 
We did not identify antigenic escape mutants at positions 141, 163, or 187.  9 
Our data suggested a key role for amino acid positions 153–156 in 10 
A(H1N1)pdm09 antigenicity; therefore, we generated HA mutant libraries with random 11 
mutations at two, or all four, of these positions (Supplementary Table 6). Random 12 
mutations at positions 153–156 were also combined with the D127E mutation in HA. 13 
This mutation is located near the Sa antigenic site, was selected in our screens 14 
(Supplementary Tables 2 and 5), and has been detected in several natural 15 
A(H1N1)pdm09 isolates. Virus libraries possessing mutations at two sites were screened 16 
with 50:50 mixtures of antisera against escape mutants at the respective positions 17 
(Supplementary Table 7); libraries possessing mutations at four or five sites were 18 
screened with a human serum (A163) obtained from an individual vaccinated with a 19 
monovalent, inactivated split-virus vaccine against A/California/07/2009 20 
(A(H1N1)pdm09) (Supplementary Table 7). More than 320 escape mutants were isolated 21 
that exhibited reduced reactivity with antiserum against the wild-type virus 22 
(Supplementary Tables 9–11). Among those, certain amino acid changes were found at 23 
 8 
higher frequency (e.g., the N156G mutation). Sequence analysis of mutagenized plasmids 1 
used for virus library generation did not show sequence biases (Supplementary Tables 12 2 
and 13); therefore, more frequently detected variants were most likely selected due to 3 
immune pressure and/or structural changes that conferred a fitness advantage.  4 
We also carried out antigenic selection studies in which A/California/04/2009 5 
virus-infected mice (Supplementary Table 14) were challenged with the mutant HA virus 6 
library possessing random amino acid changes at positions 153–156 together with the 7 
D127E mutation. We sequenced the HA gene of 53 escape viruses and detected several 8 
amino acid combinations that had also been selected in our in vitro antigenic selection 9 
experiments (Supplementary Table 15). These findings suggest that our in vitro selection 10 
experiments with human sera in part reflect in vivo immune evasion mechanisms.  11 
To obtain a comprehensive picture of the antigenic properties of selected escape 12 
variants, 469 viruses (including 447 HA escape variants selected in this study) were 13 
characterized in HI assays with a panel of ferret antisera against H1N1 influenza viruses 14 
(Supplementary Table 16). The HI data were then analyzed using antigenic 15 
cartography8,13,15,16. Many of the escape mutants form a single cluster approximately four 16 
antigenic units (representing a 16-fold reduction in HI titre) away from wild-type 17 
A/Norway/3858/2009 virus (Fig. 2a). Thus, although our in vivo selection studies resulted 18 
in the isolation of 28 different amino acid combinations, they all localized to the same 19 
novel antigenic cluster. Mutations at positions 153–156 had the greatest impact on 20 
antigenicity (Fig. 3). Importantly, single amino acid changes are sufficient to produce 21 
antigenic variants with >16-fold difference in HI titre (Fig. 2b and Supplementary Fig. 2).  22 
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To exclude the possibility that the antisera did not adequately resolve the 1 
antigenicity of the escape mutants in the antigenic cluster we identified, we raised 2 
additional ferret antisera against 10 antigenic variants that lie in the new cluster or were 3 
outliers of the original cluster (Supplementary Fig. 3; Supplementary Table 17). HI 4 
assays with these antisera did not result in appreciable changes to overall relationships or 5 
placement of any of the viruses (Supplementary Fig. 3b). Thus, the identification of only 6 
one new antigenic cluster is a valid finding and not an artifact of poor resolution of 7 
antigenic differences by the antisera used in this study. Further analysis also revealed that 8 
the accumulation of mutations at positions tested here resulted in viruses that are 9 
increasingly distinct from the parental virus (Supplementary Fig. 4); however, the effect 10 
of individual mutations cannot be summed to predict the effect of combinations of 11 
mutations (Supplementary Fig. 5).  12 
Since our study identified several potential A(H1N1)pdm09 escape variants, we 13 
analyzed the antigenicity of 2,555 recently circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 strains derived 14 
from routine WHO surveillance from 2009–2013. Isolates from each season were 15 
analyzed separately due to the lack of common antigens and antisera between the datasets 16 
(Fig. 2c, Supplementary Fig. 6a–e). Over 6% of the strains were antigenically different 17 
(i.e., more than 4-fold difference in HI titre) from the vaccine strain, 18 
A/California/07/2009. The antigenic variation seen among these viruses was 19 
representative of that seen in A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses currently circulating worldwide17. 20 
The antigenic differences found were identical to those identified with experimentally 21 
selected antigenic variants in this study in terms of distance and direction from the main 22 
antigenic cluster (typified by the vaccine strain) as well as the formation of a single 23 
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antigenically distinct cluster. No mutations at any of the other sites identified by Koel et 1 
al. were observed13. All but two of the antigenic variants identified among circulating 2 
strains contained mutations shown in this study to cause antigenic change [K153E, 3 
K154E, G155E or N156D]. The exceptions were two isolates of the same virus: egg-4 
passaged A/Iraq/8529/2009 (E3) and MDCK cell-passaged A/Iraq/8529/2009 (MDCK1). 5 
To directly compare the two datasets, we tested 20 field viruses against a subset of ferret 6 
antisera used in this study and generated a new antigenic map that merged the datasets 7 
from both experimentally generated mutants (Fig. 2b) and field strains (Fig. 2c) (Fig. 2d; 8 
a zoomable version is provided in Supplementary Fig. 6f). Isolates that were antigenically 9 
advanced, but had no sequence information, were subsequently sequenced. The antigenic 10 
properties of these viruses were consistent between the two datasets and demonstrated 11 
that a laboratory-based antigenic selection procedure can produce variants seen in 12 
surveillance samples.  13 
Our experimental data demonstrate that the amino acids at positions 153–156 of 14 
HA are critical for antigenicity. This finding is consistent with several studies showing 15 
that a small proportion of A(H1N1)pdm09 clinical strains with amino acid changes in HA 16 
positions 153–157 showed antigenic drift compared with the A/California/07/2009-like 17 
reference viruses18-20. Moreover, mutations at positions 153–157 of HA have been 18 
detected after in vitro passage of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses in the presence of monoclonal 19 
antibodies21,22 or after A(H1N1)pdm09 passage in suboptimally vaccinated ferrets20. The 20 
HA positions 153–156 are located at the edge of the receptor-binding pocket; hence, the 21 
amino acids at these positions may affect receptor-binding avidity and specificity20,23, in 22 
addition to antigenicity.  23 
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To determine whether the HA mutants selected in our study and the field strains 1 
from the new antigenic cluster could indeed evade immunity to current A(H1N1)pdm09 2 
strains, mice were immunized by infection or vaccination with an A(H1N1)pdm09 virus 3 
(Supplementary Figs 7 and 8). Four weeks later, the mice were challenged with the 4 
viruses indicated in Supplementary Figs 9 and 10 (see also Supplementary Tables 18 and 5 
19). No virus was detected on day 4 post-challenge in the lungs of immunized mice 6 
challenged with A/California/04/2009 or A/Norway/3858/2009 wild-type viruses 7 
(Supplementary Figs 9 and 10). By contrast, 12 of the 13 antigenic variants tested 8 
replicated in the lungs of immunized mice. Similarly, several viruses representing 9 
antigenic variants isolated in our study and found in field strains also replicated in mice 10 
immunized against current A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (Supplementary Fig. 10).  11 
Next, we tested whether the selected antigenic variants could evade immunity to 12 
the current A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses in ferrets, a commonly used animal model in the 13 
evaluation of influenza vaccines. Ferrets were immunized by infection with 14 
A/California/04/2009 virus. Pre-challenge serum HI titres were between 1:160 and 1:640 15 
(Supplementary Fig. 11). Twelve months later, ferrets were challenged with either 16 
A/California/04/2009 control virus, three different mutant viruses that replicated in mice 17 
immunized with wild-type virus (Fig. 4), or with an A/Norway/3568/2009 reassortant 18 
virus possessing HA changes identified in a field strain (this mutant virus replicated in 19 
mice immunized with the wild-type A/California/04/2009 virus or with the 20 
A/California/07/2009 split vaccine) (Fig. 4). No virus was detected from the nasal washes 21 
collected from the immunized ferrets challenged with A/California/04/2009 virus. By 22 
contrast, the three antigenic mutants identified in our in vivo screens and the antigenic 23 
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mutant with HA changes found in the field strain replicated efficiently in immunized 1 
ferrets. Thus, viruses possessing these mutations in HA may have the potential to cause 2 
epidemics in the future.  3 
As influenza viruses evolve and amino acid substitutions become fixed within an 4 
antigenic cluster, these changes in genetic background may affect the future evolution of 5 
the viruses. If so, antigenic evolution studies should be updated repeatedly with 6 
contemporary viruses. 7 
Retrospective antigenic evolution of H3N2 viruses 8 
To further test the potential of our experimental approach to identify future 9 
antigenic drift of influenza viruses, we carried out a retrospective study with human 10 
H3N2 viruses, whose antigenic evolution is well characterized8,13,24,25. The antigenic 11 
transition from the Sydney/1997 (SY97) cluster to the Fujian/2002 (FU02) cluster 12 
required two amino acid changes: HA-H155T and HA-Q156H13. To assess whether this 13 
cluster transition could be recapitulated experimentally, we generated a virus library with 14 
random mutations in the HA globular head of A/Hong Kong/CUHK5250/2002 15 
(CUHK5250, H3N2), a representative of the SY97 cluster that encodes HA-155H-156Q 16 
(the virus library was generated with the NA gene of CUHK5250 virus and the internal 17 
genes of A/Puerto Rico/8/34, H1N1). Our sequence analysis of human H3N2 viruses also 18 
revealed several natural isolates (for example, A/Kwangju/219/2002; Kwangju/219), that 19 
belong to the SY97 cluster, but encode the FU02-like residue HA-155T. This finding 20 
suggests that the SY97-to-FU02 transition may have occurred in two steps: from 155H-21 
156Q to 155T-156Q to 155T-156H. Since evolutionary ‘advanced’ viruses (i.e., those 22 
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with an ‘intermediate’ amino acid sequence) may be the founders of the next antigenic 1 
cluster, we also generated a virus library for Kwangju/219 (since the NA proteins of 2 
Kwangju/219 and CUHK5250 differ by only two amino acids, the CUHK5250 NA gene 3 
was used for Kwangju/219 library generation). In vitro screens for escape mutants were 4 
carried out individually with 9 human sera collected in Japan in 1999 (for the CUHK5250 5 
library; Supplementary Table 20), or with ferret antiserum to CUHK5250 (for the 6 
Kwangju/219 library; Supplementary Table 21) to select escape mutants from the SY97 7 
cluster; from these screens, we isolated 152 and 155 escape variants, respectively. The 8 
antigenic screen of the CUHK5250 mutant library did not result in the isolation of the 9 
cluster-transitioning H155T-Q156H mutations. By contrast, nine of the 155 variants 10 
isolated from the Kwangju/219 mutant library acquired the cluster-defining HA-Q156H 11 
mutation which, together with the HA-155T residue encoded by Kwangju/219, created 12 
the FU02 cluster motif of HA-H155T-Q156H. 13 
Next, HI assays were performed for 20 reference strains and for 32 and 56 mutant 14 
viruses isolated from the CUHK5250 and Kwangju/219 screens, respectively (we focused 15 
on viruses with mutations in amino acid positions known to affect antigenicity; 16 
Supplementary Tables 20 and 21). All Kwangju/219 mutants that inherently encoded 17 
HA-155T and acquired the HA-Q156H mutation localized to the edge of the FU02 18 
cluster (Fig. 5, red triangles). Most CUHK5250 mutants did not shift to the FU02 cluster, 19 
as expected by the absence of the HA-H155T-Q156H mutations. However, one 20 
CUHK5250 mutant possessing HA-Q156H-H183L mutations mapped to the outer edge 21 
of the FU02 cluster (Fig. 5, red rhombus). This variant is located in the antigenic map 22 
close to the cluster of Kwangju/219 mutants encoding HA-155T-156H (Fig. 5, red 23 
 14 
triangles). Hence, our in vitro antigenic selection identified the same antigenic drift 1 
mutants that occurred in nature (i.e., HA-H155T-Q156H) and were critical for the 2 
transition from the SY97 cluster to the FU02 cluster.  3 
Antigenic evolution of contemporary H3N2 viruses 4 
In February 2014, the WHO recommended an A/Texas/50/2012(H3N2)-like virus 5 
(TX/50) as a vaccine strain for the 2014–2015 influenza season in the Northern 6 
hemisphere. From March to September 2014, an increasing percentage of antigenically 7 
drifted H3N2 variants belonging to clades 3C.3a or 3C.2a was reported26. The antigenic 8 
difference between TX/50 and the novel clade 3C.3a and 3C.2a viruses was most likely 9 
correlated with HA-F159S and HA-F159Y mutations, respectively27. The novel antigenic 10 
clusters were dominant in most parts of the world by late 2014 and were responsible for 11 
the low vaccine effectiveness of the H3N2 component of the 2014–2015 influenza 12 
vaccine28. In February 2015, the WHO therefore recommended replacing TX/50 with a 13 
clade 3C.3a vaccine virus28. During the first half of 2015, viruses of clade 3C.2a became 14 
dominant over those of clade 3C.3a29. In September 2015, the WHO therefore 15 
recommended A/Hong Kong/4801/2014 (HK/4801; clade 3C.2a, encoding HA-159Y) as 16 
a novel vaccine virus29.    17 
To identify antigenically advanced variants of contemporary human H3N2 viruses, 18 
we generated a virus library possessing random amino acid changes at HA positions 63–19 
252 (H3 numbering) of TX/50, the WHO-recommended vaccine virus at that time. The 20 
library was screened with 10 human antisera collected in December 2013–January 2014, 21 
and with three mixtures of these antisera based on the age of the donor (Supplementary 22 
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Table 22). We identified 139 different potential escape mutants (Supplementary Tables 1 
23 and 24); the most frequently mutated amino acid position was HA-159, consistent 2 
with the role of this amino acid position in recent cluster transitions. For antigenic 3 
analysis, we chose a subset of 26 antigenic mutants that encoded amino acid changes 4 
frequently detected in these screens and/or amino acid changes known to affect 5 
antigenicity (indicated by HI titres in Supplementary Tables 23 and 24). HI assays were 6 
conducted in the presence of 20 nM oseltamivir with 19 reference antisera, and with 19 7 
reference strains. The resulting HI data were merged with data from the CDC (Fig. 6). 8 
The TX/50 antigenic cluster (encoding HA-159F; blue) and the minor 3C.3b cluster (also 9 
encoding HA-159F, yellow) are antigenically closely related, whereas the 3C.3a cluster 10 
(characterized by HA-159S; green) and the now dominant 3C.2a cluster (characterized by 11 
HA-159Y; red) are antigenically distinguishable from TX/50. Among the experimentally 12 
derived escape variants (shown in numbered mid-sized circles), the majority of 13 
antigenically ‘advanced’ mutants [i.e., those that shifted from the vaccine virus by more 14 
than two grid units (i.e., four HI units)] moved towards the currently dominant 3C.2a 15 
cluster, represented by the A/Hong Kong/4801/2014 vaccine virus (#31); some of these 16 
possessed the HA-159Y mutation. However, not all of the antigenic escape variants that 17 
shifted towards the current cluster encode a mutation at HA-159. In fact, escape mutant 18 
#27 (closest to the vaccine strain, #31) encodes mutations HA-K189E and -N225D, 19 
which are known to affect antigenic and receptor-binding specificity, respectively13,30,31. 20 
The HA-N225D mutation is present in most viruses belonging to clade 3C.2a; however, 21 
the HA-K189E mutation has not been detected in human H3N2 influenza viruses 22 
collected from January 1, 2014 to February 20, 2016, based on sequence searches in 23 
 16 
GISAID (www.platform.gisaid.org) and the Influenza Research Database 1 
(www.fludb.org). Collectively, these findings indicate that although our approach may 2 
not always identify the exact sequence of the next epidemic strains, it can predict the 3 
antigenic location of the next antigenic cluster. 4 
 5 
Discussion 6 
With the current vaccine selection process (based on comparisons of sequence 7 
and antigenic data available at the time of the WHO consultations on vaccine strain 8 
selection), uncertainty remains as to whether the recommended vaccine virus will provide 9 
protective immunity against the next epidemic strain. Here, we provide a methodology 10 
that identified H1N1 and H3N2 antigenic clusters similar to those observed in nature. 11 
These data can be generated before the variants are detected in nature; in this regard, our 12 
approach is conceptually different from methods that predict which circulating variants 13 
may become dominant32-35. Our method may therefore improve the current WHO 14 
influenza vaccine selection process. These in vitro selection studies are highly predictive 15 
of the antigenic evolution of H1N1 and H3N2 viruses in human populations. Hence, a 16 
limited number of experimental antigenic screens may be sufficient to identify potential 17 
future clusters. We found that genetic background can be important for antigenic 18 
evolution, as with the SY97-FU02 antigenic cluster transition. To put methods like ours 19 
into practice, it will likely be necessary to keep the predictions up to date by reapplying 20 
the methodology as new clades emerge. We cannot predict the HA sequence of the next 21 
epidemic strain, and (compensatory) mutations in NA may also affect antigenicity; 22 
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however, our methodology may be sufficient to predict the next antigenic cluster for 1 
proactive vaccine development.  2 
 18 
Methods  1 
Viruses and cells 2 
293T human embryonic kidney cells were maintained in DMEM supplemented 3 
with 10% fetal bovine serum. MDCK cells were grown in MEM containing 5% newborn 4 
calf serum. After infection with influenza viruses, MDCK cells were maintained in MEM 5 
containing 0.3% BSA and 0.5 μg/ml TPCK-trypsin. A/Norway/3206-3/2009 (H1N1), 6 
A/Norway/3858/2009 (H1N1), and A/Yokohama/UT-K1205T/2009 (H1N1) were 7 
amplified in MDCK cells to generate stock viruses. A/Norway/3568/2009 (H1N1) and 8 
A/California/04/2009 (H1N1) were generated using reverse genetics techniques as 9 
described36. To generate A/Hong Kong/CUHK5250/2002 (CUHK5250, H3N2), and 10 
A/Texas/50/2012 (TX/50, H3N2; cell culture-grown; see #1 in Fig. 6) virus libraries, the 11 
HA and NA genes, or just the HA gene, of these viruses were combined with the 12 
remaining six or seven genes of A/Puerto Rico/8/34 (H1N1) virus. To generate 13 
A/Kwangju/219/2002 (Kwangju/219, H3N2) virus libraries, we combined the 14 
Kwangju/219 HA gene, the CUHK5250 NA gene (note that the NA proteins of 15 
Kwangju/219 and CUHK5250 differ by only two amino acids), and the remaining genes 16 
of A/Puerto Rico/8/34 virus. The cell lines used here were maintained in our laboratory 17 
and were negative for mycoplasma contamination; they are not listed in the database of 18 
commonly misidentified cell lines. 19 
 20 
Generation of virus libraries with random mutations in the HA globular head 21 
region 22 
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The cDNAs for the HA gene of A/Norway/3858/2009, CUHK5250, 1 
Kwangju/219, and TX/50 viruses were randomly mutagenized using error-prone PCR 2 
with the GeneMorph II kit (Stratagene, La Jolla, California, USA) (note that the sequence 3 
of our CUHK5250 HA gene differed by two silent nucleotide changes from the sequence 4 
reported in the database). The randomized coding regions for amino acid positions 54–5 
253 (for the H1 viruses; H1 numbering) or 63–252 (for the H3 viruses) of HA were 6 
replaced with the corresponding region of the respective parental HA cDNA plasmid 7 
using a PCR-based cloning technique. Unbiased library composition and the targeted 8 
mutation rate (1-2 amino acid substitutions per molecule) were confirmed by sequence 9 
analysis. The sizes of our E. coli libraries (9 × 106, 1.3 × 107, 1.4 × 107, and 1.5×106 10 
colony-forming units for A/Norway/3858/2009, CUHK5250, Kwangju/219, and TX/50 11 
respectively) should represent all 7.96 × 106 combinations of two-amino acid changes 12 
within a stretch of 200 amino acids. The randomized A/Norway/3858/2009 HA plasmid 13 
library was then used to generate a virus library in the genetic background of the closely 14 
related A/Norway/3568/2009 virus. The CUHK5250 and Kwangju/219 HA plasmid 15 
libraries were used to generate virus libraries in the genetic background of the 16 
CUHK5250 NA gene and the remaining A/Puerto Rico/8/34 virus genes. The TX/50 HA 17 
plasmid library was used to generate a virus library in the genetic background of the 7 18 
remaining A/Puerto Rico/8/34 virus genes. 19 
 20 
Generation of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus libraries representing all amino acids at a 21 
defined position 22 
 20 
For random mutagenesis at a defined amino acid position, the HA plasmid was 1 
amplified with degenerate PCR primers representing mixtures of all four nucleotides at 2 
the three positions of the respective codon. The PCR products were self-ligated and 3 
transformed into E. coli, resulting in 104–106 colony-forming units per library. Virus 4 
libraries were generated as described above. The titres of the virus libraries were 3.4 × 5 
104–7.0 × 107 PFU/ml (Supplementary Table 6).  6 
 7 
Generation of reassortant viruses possessing HA and NA genes derived from 8 
A(H1N1)pdm09 field strains 9 
Plasmids for the expression of the HA and NA genes of field strains were 10 
generated by site-directed PCR mutagenesis using cDNAs for the HA and NA genes of 11 
A/Norway/3858/2009, A/Norway/3568/2009, or A/California/04/2009 as templates (for 12 
A/Qingdao/1610/2009, whose NA gene sequence is not publicly available, the NA gene 13 
of A/Norway/3568/2009 was used; for A/Miyazaki/40/2011 and A/Okinawa/41/2010, 14 
whose HA2 sequences are not publicly available, chimeric HA genes with the HA2 15 
sequence of A/Norway/3568/2009 were constructed and used). The resulting plasmids 16 
were combined with plasmids encoding the remaining six genes of A/Norway/3568/2009 17 
virus; viruses were generated as described above.  18 
 19 
In vitro selection of A(H1N1)pdm09 antigenic escape mutants from clinical isolates 20 
 21 
 
Clinical virus isolates (A/Norway/3206-3/2009 or A/Yokohama/UT-1 
K1205T/2009) were mixed with 2-fold serial dilutions of human convalescent sera and 2 
incubated at 4°C overnight. After virus neutralization, virus-serum mixtures were 3 
inoculated onto MDCK cells and incubated at 37°C for 1 h. After removal of the 4 
inoculum, cells were cultured for 2–4 days. Then, culture supernatants were collected and 5 
incubated with the highest concentration of antiserum at which a cytopathic effect was 6 
observed. Viruses in the supernatants were plaque-purified in MDCK cells and the HA 7 
genes of the purified viruses were sequenced. 8 
 9 
In vitro selection of antigenic escape mutants from A(H1N1)pdm09 or H3N2 virus 10 
libraries 11 
Virus libraries were mixed with undiluted or 2-fold serial dilutions of the 12 
respective ferret or human sera, with the exception of the H3N2 TX/50 virus library, 13 
which was mixed with individual or mixed human sera, and incubated at 4°C overnight. 14 
The virus-serum mixtures were diluted and subjected to plaque assays in MDCK cells 15 
grown in 6-well plates. Antigenic escape variants were isolated from wells that showed 16 
inhibition of virus infection (<10 plaques per well), and the HA genes of the isolated 17 
viruses were sequenced. 18 
 19 
Animal experiments  20 
 22 
All animal experiments were approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use 1 
Committee (IACUC) at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The facilities where this 2 
research was conducted are fully accredited by the Association for the Assessment and 3 
Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care International (AAALAC). The animal 4 
experiments described in this study were not designed to generate data sets for statistical 5 
analysis; hence, the sample size was small and randomization and blinding were not 6 
carried out. 7 
 8 
In vivo selection of A(H1N1)pdm09 antigenic escape mutants from virus libraries 9 
Six-week-old female BALB/c (Jackson Laboratory, Bar Harbor, Maine, USA) and 10 
C57BL6/J (Jackson Laboratory) mice were used in this study. Three mice per group were 11 
immunized by intranasal infection with 10 PFU (BALB/c mice) or 101.5 PFU (C57BL6/J 12 
mice) (50 µl) of A/California/04/09 virus. Four weeks later, we determined the HI titres 13 
of mouse sera against A/California/04/09 virus. Then, animals were challenged by 14 
intranasal infection with 106 PFU (50 µl) of either A/California/04/09 virus (control) or 15 
the virus library possessing the D127E mutation in HA and random mutations at amino 16 
acid position 153–156 of HA. On day 4 post-challenge, virus titres in mouse lungs were 17 
determined using plaque assays in MDCK cells. Viruses recovered from the lungs of 18 
successfully immunized (HI antibody titres ≥40) and virus library-challenged mice were 19 
plaque purified prior to HA sequence analysis. 20 
 21 
Challenge experiments in mice 22 
 23 
 
Six-week-old female C57BL6/J mice were immunized by intranasal infection 1 
with 101.5 PFU (50 µl) of A/California/04/2009 virus or by two vaccinations (with a two-2 
week interval) of a commercial A/California/07/2009 HA split vaccine (CSL, Parkville, 3 
Australia, 1.5 μg in 50 µl). Four weeks later, serum HI titres were determined. Three-to-4 
four mice per group with HI antibody titres ≥40 (for mice immunized by virus infection) 5 
or ≥160 (for mice immunized by vaccination) were challenged by intranasal infection 6 
with 106 PFU (50 µl) of the oseltamivir-sensitive A/California/04/2009 or 7 
A/Norway/3858/2009 control viruses, representative antigenic escape mutants, or 8 
A/Norway/3568/2009-based reassortant viruses possessing changes in HA detected in 9 
field strains. On day 4 post-challenge, virus titres in mouse lungs were determined using 10 
plaque assays in MDCK cells 11 
 12 
Challenge experiments in ferrets 13 
Six- to ten-month-old female ferrets (Triple F Farms, Sayre, Pennsylvania, USA) 14 
that were serologically negative by haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay for currently 15 
circulating human influenza viruses were infected by intranasal inoculation with 500 PFU 16 
(500 µl) of A/California/04/2009 virus. Twelve months later, serum HI titres were 17 
determined. Three or four ferrets per group with HI antibody titres between 160 and 640 18 
were challenged by intranasal infection with 107 PFU (500 µl) of A/California/04/2009, 19 
three antigenic escape mutants selected in the in vivo screens, or an A/Norway/3568/2009 20 
reassortant virus with HA changes identified in a field strain (Fig. 4 and Supplementary 21 
Fig. 11). The nasal washes of the challenged ferrets were collected daily from day 1 to 22 
 24 
day 8 post-challenge. Virus titres in the nasal washes were determined using plaque assay 1 
in MDCK cells. 2 
 3 
Generation of ferret antisera 4 
We used 6–10-month-old female ferrets (Triple F Farms, Sayre, Pennsylvania, 5 
USA) that were serologically negative by haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay for 6 
currently circulating human influenza viruses. One or two ferrets per group were 7 
anaesthetized intramuscularly with ketamine and xylazine (5–30 mg and 0.2–6 mg/kg of 8 
body weight, respectively) and inoculated intranasally with 107 PFU (500 µl) of wild-9 
type or mutant A(H1N1)pdm09, seasonal H1N1, swine H1N1, or human H3N2 virus. 10 
Three-to-four weeks later, ferrets were euthanized and sera were collected for subsequent 11 
use in HI assays or the selection of escape mutants.  12 
 13 
Antiserum treatment 14 
Human or ferret serum (100 µl) was treated with 300 µl of receptor-destroying 15 
enzyme (RDE; Denka Seiken Co., Ltd., Tokyo, Japan) at 37°C for 18–24 h. To denature 16 
the RDE solution, the serum-RDE mixture was incubated at 56°C for 30–60 min. After 17 
denaturation, 600 µl of sterile PBS and 100 µl of pelleted turkey red blood cells (TRBCs) 18 
were added and the mixture was incubated at room temperature for 60 min; during that 19 
time, the suspension was mixed every 10 min. The mixture was then centrifuged at 3000 20 
rpm at 4℃ for 5 min. Supernatants were aliquoted and stored at -20°C for use in HI 21 
 25 
 
assays. To confirm that all non-specific binding had been removed, 25 µl of PBS and 25 1 
µl of treated serum were mixed with 50 µl of 0.5% TRBCs and incubated at room 2 
temperature for 45 min. If no hemagglutination was detected, the serum could be used for 3 
HI assays; otherwise, the antiserum treatment was repeated. 4 
 5 
HI assays 6 
HI titrations were performed in 96-well U bottom microtiter plates (Thermo 7 
Scientific, Rochester, New York, USA). Sera were serially diluted 2-fold with PBS and 8 
then mixed with the amount of virus equivalent to 8 haemagglutination units, followed by 9 
incubation at room temperature for 30 min. Finally, 50 µl of 0.5% TRBCs were added. 10 
To screen TX/50 variants, sera were serially diluted 2-fold with PBS containing a final 11 
concentration of 20 nM oseltamivir, mixed with the amount of virus equivalent to 4 12 
haemagglutination units, and incubated at room temperature for 30 min; finally, 50 µl of 13 
0.75% guinea pig red blood cells with 20 nM oseltamivir was added. Serum, virus, and 14 
erythrocytes were gently mixed and incubated at room temperature for 45 min. Titres 15 
were recorded as the inverse of the highest antibody dilution that inhibited 8 or 4 16 
agglutinating units of virus, respectively. 17 
 18 
Antigenic cartography of escape mutants 19 
Antigenic maps were constructed using the antigenic cartography method8. The 20 
HI titres were mathematically transformed to create a table of antigenic distances, using 21 
 26 
the equation Dij=b-log2(Hij), where Hij is the titre of antigen i against serum j, and b is the 1 
logarithm of the maximum titre against serum j. The error function (Dij-dij)^2 was 2 
minimized where dij is the Euclidean distance between two points on the map. 3 
 4 
Sequence analysis 5 
Viral RNA was extracted from MDCK cell supernatant or purified plaques using 6 
the QIAmp viral RNA mini kit (Qiagen, Valencia, California, USA) or the MagMAX™-7 
96 Viral RNA Isolation Kit (Ambion, Austin, Texas, USA). cDNAs were synthesized 8 
from vRNAs by reverse transcription with Uni12 primer37, and amplified by PCR with 9 
gene-specific primers. Sequencing was performed on an Applied Biosystems DNA 10 
analyzer at the Biotechnology Center of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.  11 
 12 
Accession numbers 13 
 The nucleotide sequences of the HA and NA genes of A/Norway/3568/2009 14 
(H1N1), A/Norway/3858/2009 (H1N1) and A/Yokohama/UT-K1205T/2009 (H1N1) 15 
determined in this study were deposited in GenBank (accession numbers CY189537-16 
CY189542). 17 
 18 
19 
 27 
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Figure Legends 1 
Figure 1 | Schematic overview of our experimental approach to predict the antigenic 2 
evolution of human influenza A viruses. Virus libraries possessing random or targeted 3 
mutations in the antigenic region of HA are screened in vitro with antisera against human 4 
2009 H1N1 viruses or in vivo in mice immunized with a human 2009 H1N1 virus. 5 
Mutant viruses are analyzed by using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays, and 6 
antigenic cartography is then used to identify viruses that differ antigenically from the 7 
parent cluster. 8 
Figure 2 | HA antigenic cartography.  9 
An antigenic map, a geometrical representation of the HI assay data. If two viruses have 10 
similar HI titres against a panel of sera, then they are close to each other on the map. 11 
Conversely, if two viruses differ in their HI titres against a panel of sera, then they will be 12 
far apart on the map. Each grid square corresponds to a 2-fold change in HI titre (the x 13 
and y axes represent antigenic distances). (a) Map for the 447 mutant viruses (blue 14 
circles) and 42 ferret antisera (squares) together with A/Norway/3858/2009 (cyan circle), 15 
5 wild-type A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (red circles), 10 A(H1N1)pdm09-based reassortant 16 
viruses that possess changes in HA at positions 153–156 detected in field strains (orange 17 
circles), 4 seasonal H1N1 viruses (magenta circles), and two H1N1 swine viruses (pink 18 
circles). (b) Map focused on A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (light blue circles) and ferret 19 
antisera (squares) from this study. Viruses with mutations at positions 153–157 in HA are 20 
colored by amino acid type at that position (note: viruses may have more than one 21 
mutation; this can result in a change in position [see Supplementary Figs 2 and 5]). (c) 22 
 34 
Antigenic map of 862 A(H1N1)pdm09 circulating strains from WHO surveillance in 1 
2009 and 2010 (See key in b). For some circulating viruses, the identity of one or more 2 
amino acids at positions 153–157 was unclear in sequence data (pale yellow circles). 3 
Circulating viruses for which the HA sequence has not been determined are shown as 4 
light grey circles. Fig. 2c is available as a labeled, zoomable pdf in the Supplementary 5 
figures – see Supplementary Fig. 6a. (d) Antigenic map of the combined HI data from 6 
Fig. 2b,c. This map includes A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses from the mutant screens in this 7 
study (light blue circles); A(H1N1)pdm09-based reassortant viruses that possess changes 8 
in HA at positions 153–156 detected in field strains (orange circles); and circulating 9 
viruses from WHO surveillance studies with HA sequence data (pale orange circles) or 10 
without HA sequence data (light grey circles). Circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses tested 11 
with a subset of sera from this study are shown as red circles. Fig. 2d is available as a 12 
labeled, zoomable pdf in the Supplementary figures – see Supplementary Fig. 6f. 13 
Figure 3 | Structural basis of antigenic changes.  14 
Structure of the HA of A/California/04/2009; PDB 3UBN38. Amino acid positions at 15 
which single mutations result in appreciable antigenic change are shown as increasingly 16 
darker shades of green. The structure shown is a co-crystal of HA and a human-type 17 
receptor analog, NeuAc α 2-6Galβ1-4GlcNAcβ1-3Galβ1-4Glc (LSTc; shown in red).   18 
Figure 4 | Immune evasion in ferrets by HA mutations identified in this study or 19 
found in a field strain. 20 
Ferrets were infected intranasally by inoculation with 500 PFU of A/California/04/2009 21 
virus. Twelve months later, serum HI titres against A/California/04/2009 were 22 
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determined (Supplementary Fig. 9) and ferrets were challenged with 107 PFU of 1 
A/California/04/2009 (a), with representative antigenic escape mutants selected in the in 2 
vivo screens (b, c, d), or with a A/Norway/3568/2009-based reassortant virus possessing 3 
changes in HA at positions 155 and 156 detected in a field strain (e) (see Supplementary 4 
Tables 18 and 19). Shown are nasal wash virus titers collected from day 1 to day 5 post-5 
challenge (all nasal wash samples collected on days 6–8 post-challenge were negative for 6 
virus). Dashed lines, virus detection limit (1 log10 PFU/ml). 7 
Figure 5 | Antigenic map of CUHK5250 and Kwangju/219 H3N2 escape mutants. 8 
The antigenic map was generated as described in the legend to Fig. 2. Wild-type strains 9 
belonging to the Wuhan 1995, Sydney 1997, or Fujian 2002 clusters are shown in green, 10 
magenta, or yellow, respectively. Escape mutants selected from the CUHK5250 and 11 
Kwangju/219 libraries are shown as diamonds and triangles, respectively, and colored by 12 
the presence of a mutation at position 145 (cyan), 155 (orange), 156 (red), 158 (green), 13 
189 (cream), or 193 (wheat), which were recently found to be antigenically important for 14 
human H3N2 virus evolution13. 15 
Figure 6 | Antigenic map of TX/50 H3N2 escape mutants. 16 
The antigenic map was generated as described in the legend to Fig. 2. Surveillance 17 
samples are shown in small circles; experimentally derived antigenic variants are shown 18 
in mid-sized circles; vaccine viruses are shown in large circles. Surveillance samples 19 
characterized by HI assays, but not sequenced, are indicated in gray. Shown in yellow are 20 
viruses belonging to the minor cluster 3C.3b. The TX/50 cluster is indicated in blue. 21 
 36 
Antigenic escape mutations encoding HA-159F (as found for TX/50) are shown in cyan. 1 
The 3C.3a and 3C.2a clusters (characterized by HA-159S and HA-159Y, respectively) 2 
are indicated in green and red, respectively. Viruses are numbered as follows: #1, TX/50 3 
MK1/MDCK2 (used for virus library generation); #2, TX/50 HA-E172G+F193S; #3; 4 
TX/50 HA-F193S+T203A; #4, TX/50 HA-S219F; #5, TX/50 HA-I217T+N225K; #6, 5 
TX/50 HA-Q75L+N144I+I192T; #7, TX/50 HA-F174Y; #8, TX/50 HA-Y94F+N225D; 6 
#9, TX/50 HA-R220G+N225D; #10, TX/50 HA-N158D; #11, TX/50 HA-Q197R; #12, 7 
TX/50 HA-K207N+N225S; #13, TX/50 HA-W127L+N225D; #14, TX/50 HA-8 
Y94H+S107T+N225D; #15, TX/50 HA-V88I+K189N; #16, TX/50 HA-9 
F159Y+K160E+I192V+I242T; #17, TX/50 HA-F159Y; #18, TX/50 HA-L157F+N225D; 10 
#19, TX/50 HA-N144I+N158D+F193Y; #20, TX/50 HA-N225D; #21, TX/50 HA-11 
K189E; #22, TX/50 HA-K189E+I242M; #23, TX/50 HA-N122S+F159Y; #24, TX/50 12 
HA-E172D+K189E; #25, TX/50 HA-K189E+F193S; #26, TX/50 HA-13 
N128D+F159Y+N225D; #27, TX/50 HA-K189E+N225D; #28, TX/50 HA-14 
H156R+F159S+N246H/WT-NA (propagation and re-generation of viruses possessing 15 
HA-F159S+N225D failed; when we attempted to generate a PR8 virus with the NA gene 16 
of TX/50 and the TX/50 HA-F159S gene, the virus also acquired HA-H156R and N246H 17 
mutations); #29, TX/50 HA-F159S+N246H (propagation and re-generation of viruses 18 
possessing HA-F159S+N225D failed; when we attempted to generate a PR8 virus with 19 
the TX/50 HA-F159S gene, the virus also acquired a N246H mutation); #30, 20 
A/Texas/50/2012 (E5; vaccine strain); #31, A/Hong Kong/4801/2014 (NYMC-263A; 21 
vaccine strain); and #32, A/Switzerland/9715293/2013-NIB-88 (E4/E5/E2; vaccine 22 
strain). 23 
Figure 1 | Schematic overview of our experimental approach to predict 
the antigenic evolution of human influenza A viruses. Virus libraries 
possessing random or targeted mutations in the antigenic region of HA are 
screened in vitro with antisera against human 2009 H1N1 viruses or in vivo in 
mice immunized with a human 2009 H1N1 virus. Mutant viruses are analyzed 
by using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays, and antigenic cartography 
is then used to identify viruses that differ antigenically from the parent cluster. 
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Figure 2 | HA antigenic cartography. An antigenic map, a geometrical representation 
of the HI assay data. If two viruses have similar HI titres against a panel of sera, then 
they are close to each other on the map. Conversely, if two viruses differ in their HI 
titres against a panel of sera, then they will be far apart on the map. Each grid square 
corresponds to a 2-fold change in HI titre (the x and y axes represent antigenic 
distances). (a) Map for the 447 mutant viruses (blue circles) and 42 ferret antisera 
(squares) together with A/Norway/3858/2009 (cyan circle), 5 wild-type 
A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (red circles), 10 A(H1N1)pdm09-based reassortant viruses that 
possess changes in HA at positions 153–156 detected in field strains (orange circles), 4 
seasonal H1N1 viruses (magenta circles), and two H1N1 swine viruses (pink circles). (b) 
Map focused on A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses (light blue circles) and ferret antisera (squares) 
from this study. Viruses with mutations at positions 153–157 in HA are colored by 
amino acid type at that position (note: viruses may have more than one mutation; this 
can result in a change in position [see Supplementary Figs 2 and 5]). (c) Antigenic map 
of 862 A(H1N1)pdm09 circulating strains from WHO surveillance in 2009 and 2010 
(See key in b). For some circulating viruses, the identity of one or more amino acids at 
positions 153–157 was unclear in sequence data (pale yellow circles). Circulating 
viruses for which the HA sequence has not been determined are shown as light grey 
circles. Fig. 2c is available as a labeled, zoomable pdf in the Supplementary figures – 
see Supplementary Fig. 6a. (d) Antigenic map of the combined HI data from Fig. 2b,c. 
This map includes A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses from the mutant screens in this study (light 
blue circles); A(H1N1)pdm09-based reassortant viruses that possess changes in HA at 
positions 153–156 detected in field strains (orange circles); and circulating viruses from 
WHO surveillance studies with HA sequence data (pale orange circles) or without HA 
sequence data (light grey circles). Circulating A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses tested with a 
subset of sera from this study are shown as red circles. Fig. 2d is available as a labeled, 
zoomable pdf in the Supplementary figures – see Supplementary Fig. 6f. 
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Figure 3 | Structural basis of antigenic changes. Structure of the HA of 
A/California/04/2009; PDB 3UBN38. Amino acid positions at which single 
mutations result in appreciable antigenic change are shown as increasingly 
darker shades of green. The structure shown is a co-crystal of HA and a 
human-type receptor analog, NeuAc α 2-6Galβ1-4GlcNAcβ1-3Galβ1-4Glc 
(LSTc; shown in red).  
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Figure 4 | Immune evasion in ferrets by HA mutations identified in this study or 
found in a field strain. Ferrets were infected intranasally by inoculation with 500 PFU 
of A/California/04/2009 virus. Twelve months later, serum HI titres against 
A/California/04/2009 were determined (Supplementary Fig. 9) and ferrets were 
challenged with 107 PFU of A/California/04/2009 (a), with representative antigenic 
escape mutants selected in the in vivo screens (b, c, d), or with a A/Norway/3568/2009-
based reassortant virus possessing changes in HA at positions 155 and 156 detected in a 
field strain (e) (see Supplementary Tables 18 and 19). Shown are nasal wash virus titers 
collected from day 1 to day 5 post-challenge (all nasal wash samples collected on days 
6–8 post-challenge were negative for virus). Dashed lines, virus detection limit (1 log10 
PFU/ml). 
Figure 5 | Antigenic map of CUHK5250 and Kwangju/219 H3N2 escape mutants. 
The antigenic map was generated as described in the legend to Fig. 2. Wild-type strains 
belonging to the Wuhan 1995, Sydney 1997, or Fujian 2002 clusters are shown in green, 
magenta, or yellow, respectively. Escape mutants selected from the CUHK5250 and 
Kwangju/219 libraries are shown as diamonds and triangles, respectively, and colored 
by the presence of a mutation at position 145 (cyan), 155 (orange), 156 (red), 158 
(green), 189 (cream), or 193 (wheat), which were recently found to be antigenically 
important for human H3N2 virus evolution13. 
Figure 6 | Antigenic map of TX/50 H3N2 escape mutants. The antigenic map was generated as 
described in the legend to Fig. 2. Surveillance samples are shown in small circles; experimentally 
derived antigenic variants are shown in mid-sized circles; vaccine viruses are shown in large circles. 
Surveillance samples characterized by HI assays, but not sequenced, are indicated in gray. Shown in 
yellow are viruses belonging to the minor cluster 3C.3b. The TX/50 cluster is indicated in blue. 
Antigenic escape mutations encoding HA-159F (as found for TX/50) are shown in cyan. The 3C.3a 
and 3C.2a clusters (characterized by HA-159S and HA-159Y, respectively) are indicated in green 
and red, respectively. Viruses are numbered as follows: #1, TX/50 MK1/MDCK2 (used for virus 
library generation); #2, TX/50 HA-E172G+F193S; #3; TX/50 HA-F193S+T203A; #4, TX/50 HA-
S219F; #5, TX/50 HA-I217T+N225K; #6, TX/50 HA-Q75L+N144I+I192T; #7, TX/50 HA-F174Y; 
#8, TX/50 HA-Y94F+N225D; #9, TX/50 HA-R220G+N225D; #10, TX/50 HA-N158D; #11, TX/50 
HA-Q197R; #12, TX/50 HA-K207N+N225S; #13, TX/50 HA-W127L+N225D; #14, TX/50 HA-
Y94H+S107T+N225D; #15, TX/50 HA-V88I+K189N; #16, TX/50 HA-
F159Y+K160E+I192V+I242T; #17, TX/50 HA-F159Y; #18, TX/50 HA-L157F+N225D; #19, 
TX/50 HA-N144I+N158D+F193Y; #20, TX/50 HA-N225D; #21, TX/50 HA-K189E; #22, TX/50 
HA-K189E+I242M; #23, TX/50 HA-N122S+F159Y; #24, TX/50 HA-E172D+K189E; #25, TX/50 
HA-K189E+F193S; #26, TX/50 HA-N128D+F159Y+N225D; #27, TX/50 HA-K189E+N225D; #28, 
TX/50 HA-H156R+F159S+N246H/WT-NA (propagation and re-generation of viruses possessing 
HA-F159S+N225D failed; when we attempted to generate a PR8 virus with the NA gene of TX/50 
and the TX/50 HA-F159S gene, the virus also acquired HA-H156R and N246H mutations); #29, 
TX/50 HA-F159S+N246H (propagation and re-generation of viruses possessing HA-F159S+N225D 
failed; when we attempted to generate a PR8 virus with the TX/50 HA-F159S gene, the virus also 
acquired a N246H mutation); #30, A/Texas/50/2012 (E5; vaccine strain); #31, A/Hong 
Kong/4801/2014 (NYMC-263A; vaccine strain); and #32, A/Switzerland/9715293/2013-NIB-88 
(E4/E5/E2; vaccine strain). 
